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Abstract 
 
We use the financial crisis of 2007–2009 as a laboratory to examine the costs and 
benefits of teams versus single managers in asset management. We find that when a 
fund uses complex trading strategies involving the use of CDS team-managed funds 
outperform solo-managed funds. This may be due to the greater diversity of 
expertise, experience and skill of teams relative to single managers. During the 
financial crisis, however, the performance premium of teams becomes negative, 
which may be because of the slower decision times of teams, which are especially 
costly during times of rapidly changing market conditions. 
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When it comes to bond funds, there is value in the complexity. 
(Bill Kohli, manager of Putnam Diversified Income Trust) 
 
 
Many corporate bonds funds have been using credit default swaps, and thus significantly 
increased the complexity of their potential trading strategies.1 For example, CDS allow a fund 
to speculate on rising and falling credit risk premia, on counterparty risk, and to implement 
various arbitrage strategies. CDS also allow a manager to increase the implicit leverage of the 
fund. The main question we address in this paper is whether this complexity benefits the 
shareholders of a fund, and which management structures are better suited to unleash the 
alleged value for shareholders. 
There is a sizable literature investigating whether team-managed or solo-managed 
funds perform better. Teams offer several benefits vis-à-vis solo-managed funds. Teams have 
a greater diversity of expertise, experience and skill relative to a single manager, which 
should be especially valuable if a fund is using a diversity of complex trading strategies.2 On 
the other hand, teams take more time when making decisions (see Vroom, 2003). Whether the 
costs or the benefits of teams dominate is still an open question. Some studies find that team-
managed funds perform better than solo-managed funds (see Adams, Nishikawa, Rao, 2013, 
and Patel and Sarkissian, 2014), while others find the opposite (see Chen, Hong, Huang, 
Kubik, 2004). Some studies find no significant performance differences between team-
managed and solo-managed funds (see Prather and Middleton, 2002, and Bliss, Potter, and 
Schwarz, 2008). 
The occurrence of the 2007–2009 financial crisis presents us with an opportunity to 
separate some of the costs and benefits of teams versus single managers. The greater diversity 
of expertise, experience and skill of teams should be especially beneficial if a fund is using 
complex investment strategies, such as those involving CDS. Thus, among funds using CDS 
                                                
1 Our data shows that about 65% of the largest 100 corporate bond funds registered in the U.S. have been using 
CDS since 2004. 
2 Other benefits of teams are a reduction in serious decision errors (Sharpe, 1981) and more efficient risk 
allocations (see Barry and Starks, 1984). 
2 
team-managed funds should outperform solo-managed funds. In contrast, the longer decision 
times of teams should be especially costly during rapidly changing, adverse market 
conditions, such as the 2007–2009 financial crisis, especially if complex trading strategies are 
used. Therefore, we expect the performance of teams to be lower during the 2007–2009 
financial crisis than outside the crisis period vis-à-vis single manager funds. 
 We investigate these hypotheses at the sample of the largest 100 U.S. corporate bond 
funds as of 2004, which make up about 76% of the total market capitalization of all corporate 
bond funds registered in the U.S.3 We follow these 100 bond funds until the end of 2010, so 
that the 2007–2009 financial crisis is completely contained within our sample period. We 
follow Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) and define the financial crisis period as 
lasting from July 2007 until March 2009. This time was characterized by dramatic increases 
in the level and volatility of credit spreads and declines in market liquidity, especially as a 
result of the Lehman Brothers default. 
We find that corporate bonds funds significantly underperformed by 52-215 basis 
points per month during the crisis period, which is not surprising given the strong rise in 
credit spreads. Interestingly, there are no significant risk and performance differences between 
CDS users and CDS non-users in general. A reason for this is that CDS are used for a variety 
of strategies, some of which yield profits during periods of rising risk premia while others 
yield losses.4 
With respect to a fund’s management structure, we find that during normal market 
conditions funds using CDS and managed by a team outperform funds using CDS but 
managed by a single manager. This is consistent with teams having a greater diversity of 
expertise, experience and skill relative to single managers, which is especially valuable if 
                                                
3 We focus on corporate bond funds because the use of CDS is concentrated in this segment of the mutual fund 
industry. We focus on large funds because due to the minimum contract sizes of CDS they are not suitable for 
smaller funds (see Meng and ap Gwilym, 2007). The high degree of skewness in fund sizes and the focus on the 
largest funds implies that our results are most relevant to the average investor rather than the average fund. 
4 In unreported analysis, we find that funds that were net short CDS during the crisis performed worse than funds 
that were net long. 
3 
using complex trading strategies. During the crisis period, however, the performance relation 
reverses. Funds using CDS and managed by a team underperform funds using CDS but 
managed by a single manager by 31-70 basis points per month. This result may be a reflection 
of the longer decision times of teams relative to single managers, which are especially costly 
during times of high uncertainty and rapid market changes. Thus, if funds make use of 
complex trading strategies, there is value in having a team, but this is counterbalanced by the 
less efficient decision-making processes of teams, which dominates during adverse market 
conditions. 
Next, we investigate the possible reasons of this underperformance during the crisis 
period. We find that teams exhibited especially poor market-timing skills during the crisis. In 
contrast to single managers, team-managed funds increased their short CDS positions before 
credit spreads rose and vice versa. Team-managed funds were also more likely to be net short 
in their overall CDS positions than solo-managed funds during the crisis. Finally, team-
managed funds increased their short positions in asset-backed securities during the crisis. 
Given the prevailing market conditions, all three strategies should have resulted in losses 
during the crisis period. 
We also analyze the CDS usage of funds more generally, and find that the use of CDS 
by corporate bond fund managers has increased significantly over our sample period, 
mimicking the general development of the CDS market. While in 2004, only 21% of the 
largest corporate bond funds were using CDS, this fraction increased to 64% in 2008 and has 
stabilized at slightly below 50% since then. While the average total notional value of all CDS 
positions represents about 7.3% of a fund’s total net assets (TNAs), some funds hold very 
large CDS positions, which exceed the fund’s TNA. 
Most funds hold both long and short CDS positions, but short positions tend to exceed 
long positions, so that corporate bond funds as a group were always net short in CDS over our 
4 
sample period. This implies that on average funds do not use CDS to hedge credit risk, which 
would require long CDS positions. 
Not all funds use CDS.5 We find that funds belonging to a fund family are about 24% 
more likely to use CDS than funds not belonging to a fund family, which suggests that 
economies of scale are an important determinant of CDS usage. Investment grade funds are 
24% more likely to use CDS than high-yield funds. The share of institutional investors among 
a fund’s shareholders is also positively correlated with the likelihood of using CDS. 
Our results add to several strands of the literature. Our main contribution adds to our 
understanding of the benefit of teams versus single managers in asset management. The 
literature investigating the performance of team-managed funds versus solo-managed funds 
has produced inconsistent evidence so far. Adams, Nishikawa and Rao (2013) and Patel and 
Sarkissian (2014) find that team-managed funds perform better than solo-managed funds, 
while Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) finds the opposite. Prather and Middleton 
(2002) and Bliss, Potter, and Schwarz (2008) find no significant performance differences 
between team-managed and solo-managed funds. Our results show that teams can have 
advantages but also costs. In normal market conditions, the greater diversity of expertise, 
experience and skill of teams adds value if the fund is making use of complex trading 
strategies. In adverse market conditions, however, the lower efficiency of decision-making of 
teams is costly. Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Cici (2012), and Pool, Stoffman, and 
Yonker (2012) show that teams have a tendency to make inefficient investment decisions. Our 
results indicate that these inefficiencies primarily arise during adverse market conditions.  
By showing that CDS have become an important tool for corporate bond funds, and 
that CDS are not used for hedging purposes on average, we also extend the literature on the 
use of derivatives by mutual funds. Koski and Pontiff (1999) survey equity mutual funds and 
find that the use of derivatives is positively correlated with asset turnover and membership of 
                                                
5 About 30% of funds never used CDS during our sample period. 
5 
a fund family. Johnson and Yu (2004) find that the use of derivatives among Canadian funds 
is negatively correlated with fund age and positively correlated with fund size. Marin and 
Rangel (2006) confirm these findings for a sample of Spanish mutual funds. In addition, they 
find that funds that are part of a fund family, no-load funds, and funds with higher 
management fees are ceteris paribus more likely to use derivatives. Cici and Palacios (2013) 
find that funds that use equity options underperform funds that do not. However, the empirical 
evidence how derivatives usage impacts fund performance is mixed (see Koski and Pontiff, 
1999; Johnson and Yu, 2004; Marin and Rangel, 2006; and Cici and Palacios, 2013). Finally, 
Cao, Ghysels, and Hatheway (2011) find evidence that fund managers time their use of 
derivatives in response to past returns.6 
Our results also contribute to the literature on the use of CDS in general. While the 
market for credit derivatives is large by any measure, we have relatively little knowledge of 
how and why the major participants in this market, i.e., banks, hedge funds, insurance 
companies, and other asset managers, use CDS (as end-users). The exceptions are Hirtle 
(2009) and Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), who analyze the CDS positions held by 
U.S. banks, and Van Ofwegen, Verschoor, and Zwinkels (2010), who analyze the CDS usage 
by European financial institutions. To the best of our knowledge, no study has yet been 
undertaken on the use of CDS by hedge funds, insurance companies, or other asset managers. 
 
1. Sample and Construction of Variables  
Since 2004, U.S. mutual funds have been required to disclose their derivatives holdings 
quarterly on Forms N-CSR, N-CSRS, and N-Q. Searching these forms of all mutual funds 
contained in the CRSP survivorship-free mutual fund database for key words such as credit 
default, default swap, CDS, default contract, and default protection yielded hits 
                                                
6 Recently, the SEC also has become interested in the use of CDS by mutual funds. See the SEC concept paper 
titled “Use of Derivatives by Investment Companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940” (Release No. 
IC-29776). 
6 
predominantly among corporate bond funds. We therefore focus our analysis on U.S. 
corporate bond funds, which we identify by membership of one of seven Lipper fund classes: 
corporate debt funds A-rated, corporate debt funds BBB-rated, short investment grade, short-
intermediate investment grade, intermediate investment grade, multi-sector income, and high 
current yield funds. 
The typical contract size of a CDS is $5 million, and thus too large to be used by small 
funds (Meng and ap Gwilym, 2007). We therefore focus our analysis on the largest 100 U.S. 
corporate bond funds by TNA, which are included in the CRSP survivorship-free mutual fund 
database as of the end of the second quarter of 2004. This is also the most relevant set of 
corporate bond funds for investors and regulators because it makes up 76% of the overall 
market capitalization of all U.S. corporate bond funds by the end of the second quarter of 
2004. We follow these 100 funds until the end of the observation period in December 2010 to 
avoid survivorship bias.7  
For each fund, we obtain information on the fund name, fund family, manager names, 
TNAs, turnover ratio, fund classes, shares held by retail and institutional investors, fund fees, 
inception dates, daily and monthly fund returns from the CRSP mutual fund database. We add 
information on the distribution of credit ratings, the Morningstar rating, and fund manager 
information, such as gender, from Morningstar Direct for each fund. For the calculation of 
performance measures we use benchmark indices from Barclays, which are taken from 
Datastream.8 
From the N-CSR and N-Q forms, we manually collect for each fund and each CDS 
position the notional value and whether the swap was bought or sold. This step generates 
                                                
7 We analyze disappearing funds because they might be due to i) a change in the fund name; ii) a close of the 
respective fund; iii) a merger with another fund. In the last two cases, the fund history ends, while in the first 
case, we employ the fund history. Five funds were discontinued and merged with other existing funds: Fidelity’s 
Spartan Investment Grade Bond Fund was merged with the Investment Grade Bond Fund on July 28, 2006, the 
Oppenheimer High Yield Fund was merged with the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund on October 12, 
2006, the Evergreen Core Bond Fund and Evergreen Short Intermediate Bond Fund were both acquired by Wells 
Fargo Advantage Total Return Bond Fund in July 2010, and the Oppenheimer Global Strategic Income Fund 
became a “Global Income Fund” by the beginning of 2010. 
8 Note that Barclays continued to provide the Lehman Brothers series of fixed-income benchmark indices. 
7 
information on 44,777 CDS positions. From the SEC’s Form N-SAR, which registered 
investment companies must file twice a year (Deli and Varma, 2002; Almazan, Brown, 
Carlson, and Chapman, 2004), we also collect information on whether funds were engaged in 
repos, debt options, interest futures, and borrowing. Since those four strategies are highly 
correlated with each other, we construct a numerical score (Form N-SAR score), which equals 
the sum of the strategies in which a fund is simultaneously engaged. This score thus takes on 
values between 0 and 4, and controls for other complex trading strategies beyond the 
complexity achieved by CDS strategies. 
 
2. Risk and Performance Measures 
We characterize funds in terms of their risks and returns using the following risk and 
performance measures. All measures are calculated, if appropriate, on a monthly frequency. 
In particular, we estimate the respective measures on the fund-month level using a trailing 
estimation period of 60 trading days.9 
The standard deviation (STD) of daily fund returns is measured for a fund’s largest 
share class over a period. The standard deviation is calculated as follows: 
, 
where T equals 60 days, ri is the return of day t, and is the mean return for the fund over the 
last 60 trading days.  
Idiosyncratic risk (IDIO) is measured as the standard deviation of the residual of a 
market model regression and is calculated as follows: 
, 
                                                
9 Even though we concentrate on large funds, the daily returns of our top 100 funds show some stale net asset 
values (compare with Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang, 2008). We use the trade-to-trade methodology by Dimson 
(1979) as a robustness check and obtain qualitatively similar results, which are available from the authors upon 
request.   
( )∑ = −−
T
t t
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2
1
1
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ε
8 
where εt is the estimated error from a market model regression of daily fund returns rt in 
excess of the risk-free rate rf,t on a constant and the daily excess returns of the Barclays U.S. 
Aggregate Bond Index rm,t – rf,t: 𝑟! − 𝑟!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑟!,! − 𝑟!,! + 𝜀! .      (1) 
Beta risk (BETA) is measured by the β coefficient of the market model regression in 
equation (1). 
Skewness (SKEW) measures whether the return distribution is skewed to the left 
(negative values) or skewed to the right (positive values). It is defined as follows: 
!! !!!! !!!!!!! !!!! !!!!! !.!   
Kurtosis (KURT) measures whether the return distribution exhibits fat tails. 
!! !!!! !!!!!!! !!!! !!!!! !   
Monthly raw return (RETURN) measures the monthly raw fund returns using the 
CRSP returns of the largest share class per fund.  
The manipulation-proof performance measure (MPPM) is defined by Ingersoll, 
Spiegel, Goetzmann, and Welch (2007) as follows: 
, 
where Δt equals 1/360 and ρ is the risk-aversion parameter, which we set to 3.10 
Market model alpha (1ALPHA) is the α coefficient of the market model regression in 
(1). 
Three-factor model alpha (3ALPHA) is the α coefficient of the Fama-French model 
that consists of the excess return of the stock market over the risk free asset, and the HML and 
SMB factors (e.g., Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann, 2001). 
                                                
10 The chosen level of risk aversion corresponds to the baseline value used by Ingersoll, Spiegel, Goetzmann, 
and Welch (2007).  
( )
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9 
The four-factor model alpha (4ALPHA) is based on Cici and Gibson (2012). It is 
based on specification (1) which is extended by the excess return of the stock market, a 
default factor, and a mortgage market factor11.  
The five-factor model alpha (5ALPHA) is based on Fama and French (1993). It is 
based on the three-factor model, which is extended by a default factor and a term structure 
factor.  
 
3. Results 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the top 100 corporate bond funds. With mean and 
median TNAs of $5.4 billion and $2.3 billion, respectively, these funds are large by any 
measure. Nevertheless, the dispersion of fund sizes is large and highly skewed, ranging from 
204 million to over 92 billion. By far the largest corporate bond fund as of the second quarter 
of 2004 is the Total Return Fund of the PIMCO fund family with a TNA of $73 billion. The 
smallest fund is the Federated Strategic Income Fund by Federated Fixed Income Securities 
with a TNA of $1 billion. The reason why there appear to be a number of “smaller” funds 
among the top 100 is that some funds experienced significant losses and redemptions during 
the financial crisis in 2008.12 Note that the smallest of the top 100 funds in 2004 had a TNA 
of $1 billion. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The average fund age (since inception) among the top 100 bond funds is 22 years, 
ranging from as little as 4 years to 75 years. About 75% of the top 100 funds belong to a 
                                                
11 Barclays provides two versions of the GNMA index; one index with a maturity of 30 years and one index with 
a maturity of 15 years. It is not clear which index Cici and Gibson (2012) are using. We use the yield spread 
between the Barclays GNMA 30 year index and the risk-free rate because the 30 year index is the more 
commonly used index in practice. Results do not change if we use the yield spread between the Barclays GNMA 
15 year index and the risk-free rate instead.  
12 These redemptions were especially pronounced among high-yield bond funds. At least 75% of these funds 
experienced fund outflows during the sample period, while outflows occurred only in 25% of investment grade 
funds. 
10 
larger fund family, i.e., a fund family that has at least two funds among the top 100 corporate 
bond funds in its portfolio.13 There is significant variation in the average five-year probability 
of default (PD), which ranges from 0.13% to 35.18%. Thus, high-yield bond funds play an 
important role in our sample. 
Most important to our analysis, we find that about 64% of funds are managed by a 
team of two or more fund managers, which is consistent with Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker 
(2012). Females are rare among fund managers. There is only one woman among our 35 
single-manager funds, and only 18% of team-managed funds include at least one female in 
their management teams.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the BBB yield spread over our sample period. While 
the spread remains relatively stable until 2007, it rises sharply during the financial crisis, 
especially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. In the post-crisis period, the yield 
spread falls significantly, and remains relatively stable after late 2009. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Of course, the BBB yield spread was not the only market characteristic that changed 
during the financial crisis. Other yield spreads changed too, and the liquidity of many high-
risk securities dried up. For the purpose of this paper, we consider all of these changes as 
exogenous, i.e., not caused by the behavior of corporate bond funds. Furthermore, we assume 
that fund managers did not begin to use CDS because they forecasted the dramatic change in 
market conditions as a result of the financial crisis, which seems reasonable given that most 
funds were net sellers of credit protection. This allows us to investigate whether funds that 
used CDS were able to navigate a challenging market environment more successfully than 
funds that did not use CDS.  
                                                
13 This definition of a large fund family follows Koski and Pontiff (1999). 
11 
CDS can be used for a variety of strategies, which can have very different risk and 
return implications. For example, if a fund enters into short CDS positions, then this strategy 
increases the fund risk (ceteris paribus) and lowers the fund returns during times of increasing 
credit spreads. If a fund enters into long CDS positions, this strategy should improve the fund 
returns during times of increasing credit spreads, ceteris paribus. Panel B of Table 1 shows 
that the majority of the large corporate bond funds have been using CDS. CDS usage 
increased from 21% in 2004 to a maximum of 64% in 2008, and has stabilized at slightly 
below 50% since then.14 The annualized turnover of CDS positions was 32% on average and 
suggests that many fund managers use CDS for market-timing rather than for hedging 
strategies. On average, 69% of the funds were net short in CDS and the total notional value of 
all CDS positions represented about 7.3% of TNAs.15 In addition, Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the average CDS long and short positions over our sample period from 2004 to 
2010. The average CDS long position, measured by the notional value of all long CDS 
positions over a fund’s TNAs, rose from less than 1 to about 3.5% before the onset of the 
crisis. During the crisis, it peaked at around 4.5%, and it declined in the post-crisis period. 
Given the strong increase in credit risk premia during the crisis, these strategy changes are 
consistent with some fund managers using CDS to hedge credit risk. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Short CDS positions changed more dramatically, however. They increased from about 
2% of TNAs in 2004 to 4% just before the onset of the crisis. They continued to increase to 
about 9% during the crisis, and declined only after early 2008. Given that credit spreads rose 
during the crisis period and declined in the post-crisis period, these changes in CDS short 
                                                
14 The time-series variation in CDS usage is not shown in the table but is available from the authors upon 
request.  
15 We show the winsorized values for CDS turnover and the notional values on the 0.5/99.5% level to take care 
of outliers.   
12 
positions should have had a negative impact on fund performance in both the crisis and the 
post-crisis period in general. These developments also show up in the net notional amount of 
TNAs. We observe the lowest ratio in February 2008 and thus a few months before Lehman’s 
collapse. 
 
3.1 Determinants of the Use of CDS 
In this section, we first examine which funds are more likely to use CDS, in order to compare 
our results with the existing literature on derivatives usage by mutual funds. We distinguish 
between team-managed and single-manager funds because Almazan, Brown, Carlson, and 
Chapman (2004) find that more constraints with regard to derivatives usage are placed on 
funds that are managed by a team rather than a single manager. Using a probit regression, we 
estimate the following regression specification, 
 𝐶𝐷𝑆!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽  𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚 + 𝜃!𝑋!" + 𝜖!",         (2) 
where CDS is a dummy variable that equals one if fund i used CDS in quarter t and zero 
otherwise; Team equals one if the fund was managed by more than one manager and zero 
otherwise; the vector X includes control variables; αt denotes time fixed effects on the quarter 
level. 
Since the prior literature has also shown that the use of derivatives by mutual funds is 
related to the fund size, membership of a fund family, fund age, fund expenses, and asset 
turnover, we include these variables in our analysis. We also control the regression for the 
fraction of a fund’s TNAs held by institutional investors because institutional investors may 
influence a fund manager regarding CDS usage, while it is unlikely that retail investors have 
any direct impact on a fund’s derivatives strategy. In addition, we distinguish between 
investment grade and high-yield funds, which may differ in their propensity to use CDS. 
 
13 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The first column in Table 2 reports the marginal effects from a pooled probit model 
using the CDS dummy as the dependent variable. The results show that team managed funds 
are about 18% less likely to use CDS than funds that are managed by a single manager, which 
may be a reflection of the additional investment restrictions imposed on teams, but it is also 
consistent with Baer, Kempf, and Ruenzi (2011) who find that teams tend to choose less 
extreme investment strategies than single managers.  
Consistent with Koski and Pontiff (1999), we find that the use of CDS is positively 
correlated with membership of a larger fund family, the turnover ratio, the share of 
institutional investors, and the investment grade category. Funds that belong to a large fund 
family are about 24% more likely to use CDS than funds that do not belong to a large fund 
family. This suggests that economies of scale are one important determinant of CDS usage 
because the costs of setting up a CDS trading desk can be shared across several funds within 
one fund family. In addition, more active funds are also more likely to use CDS. The larger is 
the share of institutional investors, the higher is the likelihood that a fund will use CDS. This 
suggests that small institutional investors may use mutual funds, possibly to gain (indirect) 
access to CDS.  
We further find that investment grade funds are about 24% more likely to use CDS 
than high-yield funds. This result may have several causes. First, it could be a pure supply 
effect as CDS on investment grade debt tend to be more liquid than CDS on high-yield debt. 
Second, it could be that investment grade funds have stronger incentives for risk-shifting 
strategies using CDS than high-yield funds. The returns of investment grade funds tend to be 
more clustered than the returns of high-yield funds. Thus, a relatively small performance 
improvement could affect the relative performance ranking of investment grade funds, while 
the same performance improvement may be insufficient to affect the relative ranking of high-
14 
yield funds. An argument against a pure supply effect is that investment grade funds engage 
in riskier CDS than indicated by their general asset allocations. The average fraction of junk-
rated CDS reference names is 14.9%, while the average fraction of junk-rated corporate bonds 
is only 4.9%. In contrast, high-yield funds show a lower proportion of junk-rated CDS 
reference names (64%) compared with their junk-rated bond positions (80.1%), on average.16 
Thus, investment grade funds are not only more likely to use CDS, but they are also more 
prone to invest in riskier reference names. In contrast to earlier studies, however, we find no 
size effect in our sample, probably because we focus on just the largest bond funds.  
Since CDS can be short or long, we examine the determinants of being net long or net 
short for those funds that use CDS. We define a dummy variable Net short, which takes the 
value 1 if fund i is net short over all the value-weighted CDS positions in quarter t and zero 
otherwise. We thus replace the dependent variable of specification (2) with Net short. The 
probit regression results are shown in column 2. Most notably, funds managed by female fund 
managers are around 22% less likely to be net short in CDS, which may be a reflection of the 
higher risk-aversion of women relative to men. In contrast, team-managed funds are not more 
prone to be net short in CDS relative to solo-managed funds. Funds that belong to a big fund 
family are around 29% more likely to be net short on average. Thus, these funds are not only 
more likely to use CDS, but they are also more likely to be net short.17  
 
3.2 The Use of CDS and Fund Performance 
Panel A of Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of all risk and performance measures. The 
standard deviation of daily raw returns (STD) was 1.19% per month, while the average raw 
return (RETURN) was 0.44% per month. The average and median alphas are all positive. 
                                                
16 These results are not reported in the tables, but are available from the authors upon request. 
17 We also estimate specifications with further explanatory variables, such as fund flow, average PD, net cash 
ratio, Form N-SAR score, or Morningstar rating. None of these variables enter the CDS usage/net short 
regressions significantly. 
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However, the four-factor alpha (4ALPHA) was close to zero, which implies that the average 
fund performance is explained by the stock market, the default and the mortgage factors. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In Table 3, Panel B, we report the average risk and performance measures for the 
crisis and non-crisis periods separately. All measures indicate that during the crisis period, 
funds’ return distributions were very different compared to non-crisis periods. During the 
crisis, the fund returns were more volatile due to more idiosyncratic risk, negative extreme 
returns were more likely (left-skewed) and the overall return distributions had fatter tails. All 
performance measures indicate worse performance for corporate bond funds during the crisis. 
The differences are dramatic and statistically significant on any conventional level. 
Next, we examine whether there are performance differences between the funds that 
were using CDS and those that were not. Using an OLS regression, we estimate the following 
specification 
 𝑌!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽!𝐶𝐷𝑆 + 𝛽! 𝐶𝐷𝑆 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝜃!𝑋!! + 𝜖!"                   (3) 
where Yit denotes the various performance measures; Crisis identifies the crisis period as 
defined by Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012); CDS equals one if fund i used CDS 
in month t and zero otherwise; the vector X includes the control variables of Panel A of Table 
1; αc denotes fund category fixed effects. The coefficient of interest is ß3, which provides the 
interaction effect of CDS usage during the crisis. 
The results in Table 4 confirm that there were significant risk and performance 
differences during the crisis and the two non-crisis periods.18 However, we observe no 
significant risk and performance differences between CDS users and CDS non-users. CDS 
                                                
18 Note that we do not distinguish between the two non-crisis periods but rather contrast the crisis period with 
both the non-crisis periods in all the analyses below. We omit estimates for all the control variables – the fund 
characteristics of Table 1, Panel A – due to space constraints. 
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users exhibit slightly higher systematic risk (BETA). In terms of performance, only the four-
factor and five-factor alphas indicated that CDS users outperformed non-users. But the 
economic magnitude is small with 9-11 basis points per month. During the crisis period, CDS 
users underperformed non-users, but the economic magnitude is small (19 basis points per 
month based on the four-factor alpha) and the result is not robust based on the other risk-
performance measures. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
3.3 Teams versus Single Managers 
In this section, we examine some of the costs and benefits of teams versus single managers in 
asset management. Our first hypothesis states that when executing complex strategies, i.e., 
those involving CDS, team-managed funds outperform solo-managed funds during normal 
market condition. In contrast, our second hypothesis postulates that in rapidly changing 
market conditions, e.g., during financial crises, the slower decision-making of teams reduces 
the performance of team-managed funds. 
In order to test these hypotheses, we augment specification (3) with further interaction 
terms and estimate the following OLS regression 
 𝑌!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽!𝐶𝐷𝑆 + 𝛽!𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚 + 𝛽! 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽! 𝐶𝐷𝑆 ∗𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 + 𝛽! 𝐶𝐷𝑆 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚 + 𝛽! 𝐶𝐷𝑆 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚 + 𝜃!𝑋!" + 𝜖!",                 (4) 
where all variables are defined as in equations (2) and (3). Our first hypothesis implies (ß3 + 
ß6) > 0, while our second hypothesis implies (ß3 + ß4 + ß6 + ß7) < 0. We test both hypotheses 
using Wald tests. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
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The results in Table 5 show that team-managed funds that are using CDS perform 
better than solo-managed funds using CDS during normal market conditions. The second 
Wald test in Table 5 indicates a performance premium of 19-50 basis points per month. This 
performance premium is driven by both higher returns and lower risk. In contrast, among 
funds not using any CDS strategies, there are no significant performance differences between 
team-managed and solo-managed funds outside the crisis.19 These results show that the 
greater diversity of expertise, experience and skill of teams relative to a single manager is 
valuable to investors only if the fund is using complex strategies during normal market 
conditions. These results confirm the first hypothesis. 
During the financial crisis, however, the performance premium of teams that use CDS 
is negative (see third row of Wald tests in Table 5). In fact, teams underperform single 
managers by 31-70 basis points per month. In contrast, among funds not using any CDS 
strategies, there are again no significant performance differences between team-managed and 
solo-managed funds.20 These results confirm our second hypothesis and show that teams 
perform poorly in adverse market conditions when employing complex strategies.21 This 
could be due to the slower decision times of teams, which would be costly during times of 
rapidly changing market conditions. Decision times are, of course, not directly observable. 
However, we can examine some of the actual investment decisions of teams during the crisis 
and non-crisis periods. The return volatilities and idiosyncratic risk measures shown in Table 
5, already suggest that team-managed and solo-managed funds have pursued different 
investment strategies during the crisis. Team-managed funds using CDS exhibited 
significantly higher return volatilities than solo-managed funds using CDS.  
                                                
19 See the results for the Team coefficient. Note that we do not display a Wald test for this case because there is 
no combination of coefficients needed. 
20 Some of the performance measures indicate that team-managed funds outperform solo-managed funds, but the 
statistical significance is weak (see first row of Wald tests in Table 5). 
21 Unreported results suggest that team managed funds also underperform single managed funds during the crisis 
if they use other complex trading strategies, such as debt options or interest rate futures, as well. These results 
are available from the authors upon request.  
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 We examine some of the CDS strategies more precisely in Table 6. In particular, we 
focus on the likelihood to be net short in CDS and the use of CDS on asset-backed securities, 
which experienced dramatic value losses during the financial crisis. The results in Table 6 
show that teams were less likely to be net short CDS outside the crisis, and more likely to be 
net short CDS during the crisis. Given that credit spreads rose significantly during the crisis, 
being net short CDS during this time was the wrong position and can explain some of the 
losses experienced by team-managed funds during the crisis. 
 Furthermore, the results also show that team-managed funds had larger short positions 
in CDS on asset-backed securities than solo-managed funds during the crisis. Given the 
dramatic value losses on asset-backed securities during the financial crisis those CDS 
positions must have generated significant losses for team-managed funds. Overall, these 
results show that teams tended to be on the wrong side of the market during the crisis period. 
 Finally, we analyze the short-term market-timing skills of teams versus single 
managers using CDS. In Figure 2, we observed significant changes in a fund’s long and short 
notional CDS positions over our entire sample period. In addition, we observe significant 
cross-sectional differences in CDS usage. The average net notional CDS amount ranged from 
as little as -57.9% of TNAs to a maximum of 22.9% of TNAs (see Panel B of Table 1). If a 
manager increased a fund’s net short CDS position before credit spreads fell and decreased a 
fund’s net short position before credit spreads rose, then this strategy should yield 
performance improvements ceteris paribus. 
To examine managers’ short-term market timing skills using CDS more rigorously, we 
determine the correlation between changes in funds’ net CDS positions, measured by the net 
notional amount over a fund’s TNA, and credit spreads over the next 1–3 months. 
Specifically, we run the following OLS regression 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡  𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡!" 𝑇𝑁𝐴!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑!!! + 𝜃!𝑋!" + 𝜀!",               (4) 
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where Spread is measured by the BBB (or AAA) corporate yield spread over U.S. treasuries 
of month t+1 (or t+3), αi are fund fixed effects, and X includes a vector of time-varying 
control variables. A positive coefficient ß1 indicates market-timing skill. 
Table 7, Panel A presents the regression results for the entire sample period. The 
coefficients on the spread variables are between -0.56 and -1.61, and are statistically 
significant. They indicate that increases in the net short CDS position are followed by 
increases in credit spreads over the next 1–3 months. This implies that these adjustments to a 
fund’s net CDS position must have had a negative impact on fund performance. Our findings 
are in line with those of Comer, Boney, and Kelly (2009), who find poor market-timing 
ability for high-quality bond funds, but are in contrast with those of Chen, Ferson, and Peters 
(2010), who find neutral to weakly positive market-timing ability for bond mutual funds. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Next, we analyze the market-timing skills of teams and single managers separately, by 
adding an interaction term Spread * Team to equation (4). Note that the individual Team 
variable was part of the control variables X in Panel A. The results are reported in Panel B of 
Table 7. We find that the negative short-term market timing effect is primarily present in 
team-managed rather than solo-managed funds, which implies that it is mostly teams who 
exhibit poor market timing skills. Finally, we examine managers’ market timing skills for the 
crisis and non-crisis periods separately. The results in Table 7, Panel C show that teams 
exhibit poor market timing skills especially during the crisis period, not during the non-crisis 
periods. These results are consistent with the poor performance of teams that employ CDS 
strategies during the crisis as shown in Table 5. The results do not, however, explain why 
teams performed relatively better during non-crisis periods. Therefore, this outperformance 
must be due to reasons other than superior market timing capabilities. For example, being net 
20 
short CDS generated fee income outside the crisis, which may have contributed to the 
relatively better performance of teams during non-crisis periods. 
In summary, our results show that teams made a number of wrong investment 
decisions involving the use of CDS during the crisis period, which at least partially explain 
the poor performance of team-managed funds during this time. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyze the use of credit default swaps by the largest 100 U.S. corporate 
bond funds between 2004 and 2010. We find that the use of CDS increased from about 20% 
of funds in 2004 to over 60% of funds in 2008 and stabilized at about 50% after the crisis. 
The size of a fund’s total CDS position (measured by CDS notional values) is usually less 
than 10% of a fund’s TNAs, but some funds exceed this level by a wide margin, especially 
during the financial crisis. Overall, funds are net sellers of CDS, which shows that fund 
managers do not use CDS to hedge credit risk on average. The high turnover of CDS 
positions also suggests that many fund managers use CDS for market-timing rather than for 
hedging strategies. 
We find that if funds made use of complex trading strategies involving CDS, team-
managed funds outperform solo-managed funds during normal market conditions. This may 
be due to the greater diversity of expertise, experience and skill of teams relative to a single 
manager, which should be especially valuable if a fund is using a diversity of complex trading 
strategies. In contrast, during the financial crisis the performance premium of teams becomes 
negative. This is because during this time, team-managed funds made especially poor 
investment decisions involving CDS. These results indicate that while teams have some 
advantages over single managers during normal market conditions, the less efficient decision-
making processes of teams can be costly during adverse market conditions. 
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Figure 1: Spread development 
Yield spread between the BBB-rated corporate bonds and the risk-free rate. The data are taken from the Fed 
website. The pre-crisis period ranges from 2004M07 to 2007M06, the crisis period follows Ben-David, Franzoni, 
and Moussawi (2012) and spans from 2007M07 to 2009M03, while the post-crisis period includes 2009M04 to 
2010M12. 
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Figure 2: Development of CDS usage intensity and direction 
The figure shows the size of long (solid line), short (dotted line), and net (dashed line) CDS positions for CDS-
using funds, measured by the ratio of CDS notional amounts over a fund’s TNAs. All values are winsorized on 
the 0.5/99.5%. The pre-crisis period ranges from 2004M07 to 2007M06, the crisis period follows Ben-David, 
Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012) and spans from 2007M07 to 2009M03, while the post-crisis period includes 
2009M04 to 2010M12. 
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Table 1: Fund characteristics and CDS usage 
Panel A shows the fund characteristics of the top 100 U.S. mutual corporate bond funds between 2004Q3 and 
2010Q4. The data are on the fund-quarter level, yielding 26 observations per fund, except for five funds that 
were merged with other funds and observations with missing values in at least one necessary variable. The top 
100 funds are defined as the largest (by TNAs) 100 corporate bond funds in the CRSP survivorship-free mutual 
fund database as of the end of the second quarter of 2004. We define a fund as a corporate bond fund if it 
belongs to one of the following Lipper fund classes: corporate debt funds (A-rated), corporate debt funds (BBB-
rated), intermediate investment grade debt funds, short investment grade debt funds, short-intermediate 
investment grade debt funds, multi-sector income funds, and high current yield funds. The first five categories 
are investment grade, while the latter two are below investment grade. Team is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the fund is managed by two or more managers and 0 otherwise. Female is a dummy variable that equals 1 if at 
least one woman was involved in managing the fund in the respective quarter. TNA denotes a fund’s total net 
assets. Big fund family is a dummy variable that equals 1 if another fund in our sample belongs to the same fund 
family and 0 otherwise. Fund age measures the number of years since a fund’s inception. Expense ratio is the 
sum of a fund’s operating expenses (including 12b-1 fees, waivers, and reimbursements) over a fund’s TNAs. 
Turnover ratio is defined as the minimum of aggregated sales and purchases of securities divided by the 12-
month average TNAs. Institutional investors is the proportion of a fund’s TNA held by institutional investors 
(net assets of institutional investor fund classes/TNAs). Investment grade is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
investment grade funds and 0 for high-yield funds. Monthly fund flow is measured by (TNAt – TNAt-1(1 + 
monthly fund returnt))/TNAt-1. We approximate credit risk by weighting a bond’s credit ratings by the average, 
cumulative five-year default frequency (Average PD). Net cash ratio is the net cash (cash minus liabilities) over 
a fund’s TNAs. The Form N-SAR score ranges between 0 and 4. The score sums up four dummy variables that 
take the value 1 if the fund is engaged in repos, debt options, interest futures, or borrowing and 0 otherwise. 
Morningstar rating is the numerical Morningstar rating. The data are from the CRPS survivorship-free mutual 
fund database, Morningstar, Moody’s Ratings, and the SEC’s Edgar. Panel B provides the CDS usage 
characteristics. The data are from the SEC’s Edgar and from EdgarOnline. CDS is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if a fund used CDS in the respective quarter and 0 otherwise. Net short equals 1 if a fund’s CDS positions were 
net short on average in the respective quarter and 0 otherwise. CDS turnover is the annualized CDS turnover. 
The last four variables are TNA-weighted CDS intensity measures, using either the total notional amount of all 
CDS positions, the net notional amount of all CDS positions, or only the short or long positions. 
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Panel A: Fund characteristics 
Variable Mean SD Min. p50 Max. N 
Team (dummy) 0.644 0.479 0.000 1.000 1.000 2,554 
Female (dummy) 0.181 0.385 0.000 0.000 1.000 2,554 
TNA 5,414 11,221 204 2,315 92,875 2,554 
Big fund family (dummy) 0.746 0.435 0.000 1.000 1.000 2,554 
Fund age (in years) 22 10 4 20 75 2,554 
Expense ratio 0.779 0.342 0.132 0.741 1.724 2,554 
Turnover ratio 1.417 1.534 0.150 0.820 10.070 2,554 
Institutional investors 0.334 0.387 0.000 0.125 1.000 2,554 
Investment grade (dummy) 0.611 0.488 0.000 1.000 1.000 2,554 
Monthly fund flow -0.002 0.024 -0.069 -0.002 0.058 2,554 
Average PD (in percent) 8.057 8.819 0.132 2.376 35.180 2,554 
Net cash ratio (in percent) 9.783 14.283 -50.730 7.075 68.815 2,554 
Form N-SAR score 1.256 0.840 0.000 1.000 4.000 2,554 
Morningstar rating 3.391 0.963 1.000 3.000 5.000 2,554 
 
Panel B: CDS usage 
Variable Mean SD Min. p50 Max. N 
CDS (dummy) 0.4475 0.4973 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 2,554 
Net short (dummy) 0.6850 0.4647 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1,143 
              
CDS turnover 0.3178 0.6095 0.0000 0.0050 4.0000 1,143 
Net notional amount / TNA -0.0222 0.0852 -0.5785 -0.0069 0.2294 1,143 
Notional amount / TNA 0.0725 0.1371 0.0002 0.0294 1.0142 1,143 
Short notional amount / TNA -0.0461 0.0959 -0.6965 -0.0172 0.0000 1,143 
Long notional amount / TNA 0.0244 0.0535 0.0000 0.0047 0.4010 1,143 
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Table 2: Determinants of CDS usage  
This table reports the marginal effects of the probit regressions. The dependent variable in the first column, CDS, 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if fund i used CDS in quarter t and 0 otherwise. For the second column, Net 
short equals 1 if a fund’s CDS positions were net short on average in the respective quarter and 0 otherwise. 
Refer to Table 1 for a description of the sample selection process and the variable definitions. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level 
and are reported in parentheses.  
 
Variable CDS (dummy) Net short (dummy) 
Team -0.1777** -0.0830 
  (0.0825) (0.1038) 
Female -0.1341* -0.2205*** 
  (0.0799) (0.0685) 
TNA -0.0013 0.0026 
  (0.0036) (0.0017) 
Big fund family 0.2398** 0.2926*** 
  (0.0913) (0.1029) 
Fund age 0.0069 -0.0027 
  (0.0044) (0.0035) 
Expense ratio 0.1681 -0.0610 
  (0.1694) (0.1448) 
Turnover ratio 0.0672* -0.0130 
  (0.0399) (0.0213) 
Institutional investors 0.2928** 0.0603 
  (0.1166) (0.1125) 
Investment grade 0.2358** -0.1364 
  (0.0956) (0.0877) 
      
Time FE Yes Yes 
N 2,554 1,143 
Adj. R square 0.1915 0.0877 
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Table 3: Distribution of risk-performance measures 
Panel A shows the distribution of risk-performance measures of the top 100 funds. Refer to Table 1 for the sample selection process. We use the daily CRSP fund returns of the 
largest share class per fund. All the measures are on a monthly basis if appropriate. STD is the standard deviation of the fund returns. IDIO is the unsystematic risk measured by 
the standard deviation of the residual terms of the market model regression, which is a regression of the daily fund returns in excess of the risk-free rate on a constant and the 
daily returns of the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index in excess of the risk-free rate. BETA is the systematic risk measured by the beta coefficient of the market model 
regression. SKEW is the skewness of the fund returns. KURT is the excess kurtosis of the fund returns. RETURN is the monthly raw fund returns. MPPM is a manipulation-proof 
performance measure. 1ALPHA is the market model alpha measured by the constant of the market model regression. 3ALPHA is the alpha of the Fama-French three-factor model. 
4ALPHA is the alpha of the four-factor model using the aggregate bond market, the stock market, a default factor, and a mortgage market factor (Cici and Gibson, 2012). 
5ALPHA is the alpha of the five-factor model that extends the Fama-French three factor model by a default factor and a term structure factor (Fama and French, 1993). Panel B 
shows the average risk-performance measures by non-crisis and crisis period (2007M07–2009M03) following Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012). The non-crisis period 
consists of the pre- (2004M07–2007M06) and post-crisis periods (2009M04–2010M12). We use a t-test with unequal variances for the differences between the crisis and the non-
crisis periods. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Distribution 
Variable Mean SD Min. p50 Max. N 
STD 0.0119 0.0074 0.0026 0.0098 0.0504 7,264 
IDIO 0.0084 0.0072 0.0015 0.0060 0.0502 7,264 
BETA 0.5863 0.4940 -0.5502 0.6179 2.6090 7,264 
SKEW 0.3304 0.7338 -1.5806 0.2294 2.8532 7,264 
KURT 4.3424 2.0373 2.0799 3.7616 15.053 7,264 
RETURN 0.0044 0.0195 -0.1080 0.0056 0.0783 7,264 
MPPM 0.0044 0.0226 -0.1362 0.0050 0.0785 7,264 
1FALPHA 0.0021 0.0213 -0.1340 0.0011 0.0790 7,264 
3FALPHA 0.0047 0.0211 -0.1152 0.0049 0.0731 7,264 
4FALPHA 0.0006 0.0069 -0.0364 0.0008 0.0208 7,264 
5FALPHA 0.0035 0.0147 -0.0830 0.0022 0.0502 7,264 
 
Panel B: Averages by period 
Period STD IDIO BETA SKEW KURT RETURN MPPM 1FALPHA 3FALPHA 4FALPHA 5FALPHA 
Non-crisis 0.0098 0.0066 0.5953 0.4468 4.5214 0.0073 0.0093 0.0070 0.0085 0.0019 0.0064 
Crisis 0.0182 0.0136 0.5599 -0.0081 3.8224 -0.0041 -0.0096 -0.0120 -0.0066 -0.0034 -0.0049 
Difference 0.0085*** 0.0070*** -0.0354*** -0.4549*** -0.6991*** -0.0114*** -0.0189*** -0.0190*** -0.0151*** -0.0053*** -0.0112*** 
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Table 4: Determinant of fund performance: CDS usage 
This table shows the OLS regression results with respect to the CDS usage decision of the top 100 funds. Refer to Table 1 for the sample selection process. The dependent 
variables are the risk-performance measures as defined in Table 3. Crisis equals 1 for the crisis period (2007M07–2009M03) and 0 otherwise. CDS equals 1 if fund i used CDS in 
quarter t and 0 otherwise. The control variables include the fund characteristics of Panel A of Table 1. We use fund category fixed effects according to the seven Lipper fund 
classes that are described in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are 
reported in parentheses. 
 
Variable STD IDIO BETA SKEW KURT RETURN MPPM 1FALPHA 3FALPHA 4FALPHA 5FALPHA 
Crisis 0.0081*** 0.0069*** -0.0657*** -0.4402*** -0.8453*** -0.0114*** -0.0185*** -0.0189*** -0.0141*** -0.0041*** -0.0099*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0188) (0.0538) (0.1540) (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
CDS 0.0006 0.0006 0.0395* 0.0183 0.0366 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0013 0.0009*** 0.0011* 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0232) (0.0660) (0.1475) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
CDS * Crisis 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0240 -0.0471 0.1649 0.0012 0.0000 0.0008 -0.0015 -0.0019** -0.0022 
  (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0241) (0.0665) (0.1850) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0015) 
                        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 
Adj. R square 0.3764 0.4269 0.7172 0.1502 0.1954 0.1048 0.1719 0.1980 0.1486 0.1653 0.1935 
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Table 6: Determinants of CDS usage – Crisis interaction 
This table reports the marginal effects of a probit regression (first column) and the OLS results (second column). 
The dependent variable in the first column, Net short equals 1 if a fund’s CDS positions were net short on 
average in the respective quarter and 0 otherwise. For the second column, Net notional of ABS reference names / 
TNA equals the sum of the net notional amounts of CDS with asset back securities (ABS) reference names over 
the funds’ TNA. The independent variables include the fund characteristics of Panel A of Table 1 and 
additionally the CDS turnover in the second column. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses.  
 
Variable Net short (dummy) 
Net notional - ABS 
reference names / TNA 
Crisis -0.1106 -0.0006 
  (0.0862) (0.0011) 
Team -0.2604*** 0.0011 
  (0.0780) (0.0013) 
Team * Crisis 0.1999** -0.0083** 
  (0.0678) (0.0038) 
      
Regression Probit OLS 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Fund category FE Yes Yes 
N 1,143 1,143 
Adj. R square 0.1367 0.1285 
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Table 7: Market timing 
This table shows the market-timing regression results. The data are on the fund-month level. Panel A provides 
the results for the general effect. We estimate OLS regressions with Net notional amount/TNA as the dependent 
variable and BBB (columns 1 and 2) and AAA corporate credit spreads (columns 3 and 4) over treasuries of 
month t+1 and respectively t+3 as the main independent variables. The yield data are taken from the Fed 
website. The time-varying control variables include ln(TNA), ln(Fund age), expense ratio, turnover ratio, share 
of institutional investors, team managed, female fund manager, average PD of bonds, average share junk-rated 
bonds, net cash ratio, Morningstar rating, monthly fund flows, and CDS turnover. We also use fund fixed effects. 
Panels B shows the differential effect with respect to team management. Panel C repeats the Panel B analysis by 
using observations from the pre- and post-crisis period only. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: General effect 
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Type of spread: BBB Spreadt+1 BBB Spreadt+3 AAA Spreadt+1 AAA Spreadt+3 
          
Spreadt+n -0.5566* -0.6422* -1.5143** -1.6111** 
  (0.3225) (0.3661) (0.6803) (0.7908) 
          
Time-varying control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,444 3,444 3,444 3,444 
R square 0.1640 0.1664 0.1673 0.1687 
 
 
Panel B: Differential effect with respect to team management 
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Type of spread: BBB Spreadt+1 BBB Spreadt+3 AAA Spreadt+1 AAA Spreadt+3 
          
Teamt 0.0415* 0.0527** 0.0525* 0.0633** 
  (0.0229) (0.0238) (0.0266) (0.0284) 
Spreadt+n 0.2546 0.4372 0.3514 0.6992 
  (0.4038) (0.3513) (0.7970) (0.7258) 
Spreadt+n * Teamt -1.3215* -1.7450** -3.1913* -3.9462** 
  (0.7863) (0.7929) (1.8165) (1.8860) 
          
Time-varying control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,444 3,444 3,444 3,444 
R square 0.1741 0.1848 0.1800 0.1886 
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Panel C: Differential effect with respect to team management – pre- and post-crisis periods only 
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Type of spread: BBB Spreadt+1 BBB Spreadt+3 AAA Spreadt+1 AAA Spreadt+3 
          
Teamt 0.0178 0.0183 0.0142 0.0132 
  (0.0230) (0.0313) (0.0197) (0.0221) 
Spreadt+n 0.3787 0.8399 0.9525 1.1840 
  (0.5430) (0.7762) (0.9155) (0.9259) 
Spreadt+n * Teamt -0.3384 -0.4381 -0.4560 -0.4224 
  (0.8996) (1.3362) (1.3846) (1.6167) 
          
Time varying control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,222 2,222 2,222 2,222 
R square 0.1090 0.1108 0.1115 0.1125 
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Table 5: Determinant of fund performance: CDS usage – Differential effect with respect to team management 
The table shows the OLS regression results of the CDS usage decision and the differential effect with respect to team management of the top 100 funds. Refer to Table 1 for the 
sample selection process. The dependent variables are the risk-performance measures as defined in Table 3. Crisis equals 1 for the crisis period (2007M07–2009M03) and 0 
otherwise. CDS equals 1 if fund i used CDS in quarter t and 0 otherwise. Team is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if fund i was managed by a team in quarter t and 0 
otherwise. The Wald tests provide additional results for various combinations of individual coefficients testing team- versus solo-managed funds. The control variables include 
the fund characteristics of Panel A of Table 1. We use fund category fixed effects according to the seven Lipper fund classes that are described in Table 1. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses. 
 
Variable STD IDIO BETA SKEW KURT RETURN MPPM 1FALPHA 3FALPHA 4FALPHA 5FALPHA 
Crisis 0.0093*** 0.0086*** -0.1207** -0.5201*** -0.8461*** -0.0138*** -0.0237*** -0.0243*** -0.0169*** -0.0051*** -0.0121*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0557) (0.0908) (0.3030) (0.0027) (0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0012) (0.0020) 
CDS 0.0012* 0.0013** 0.0287 0.1616 0.2955 -0.0015 -0.0025 -0.0037*** -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0009 
  (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0384) (0.1019) (0.2404) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
Team -0.0006 0.0000 -0.0930* 0.1709 0.3440 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0001 0.0005 
  (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0524) (0.1032) (0.2521) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Team * Crisis -0.0016 -0.0023 0.0768 0.1066 -0.0055 0.0034 0.0072 0.0076 0.0039 0.0014 0.0030 
  (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0617) (0.1109) (0.3372) (0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0014) (0.0024) 
CDS * Crisis -0.0025* -0.0036** 0.0710 -0.0046 -0.0169 0.0075** 0.0126** 0.0131** 0.0086* 0.0027* 0.0051* 
  (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0626) (0.1175) (0.3464) (0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0014) (0.0027) 
CDS * Team -0.0010 -0.0012 0.0154 -0.2246* -0.4141 0.0021** 0.0049*** 0.0055*** 0.0040** 0.0028*** 0.0035*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0493) (0.1201) (0.2925) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
CDS * Crisis * Team 0.0038** 0.0051*** -0.0639 -0.0372 0.3140 -0.0097*** -0.0192*** -0.0187*** -0.0157*** -0.0072*** -0.0113*** 
  (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0709) (0.1403) (0.3957) (0.0035) (0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0017) (0.0031) 
                        
Wald tests: Team- vs solo-managed funds                     
During the crisis, no CDS usage -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0162 0.2775*** 0.3385 0.0032 0.0073* 0.0071* 0.0048 0.0013 0.0035* 
Outside the crisis, with CDS usage -0.0016** -0.0012* -0.0776** -0.0537 -0.0701 0.0019** 0.0050*** 0.0050*** 0.0049*** 0.0027*** 0.0040*** 
During the crisis, with CDS usage 0.0006 0.0016* -0.0647* 0.0157 0.2384 -0.0044** -0.0070** -0.0061** -0.0069*** -0.0031*** -0.0043*** 
                        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund category FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 7,264 
Adj. R square 0.3790 0.4320 0.7176 0.1551 0.1968 0.1074 0.1799 0.2061 0.1562 0.1823 0.2013 
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